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ABSTRACT 
The food supply chain plays a substantial role in the European economy. Agricultural markets are highly 
interdependent and competition at different stages of the supply chain matters for the overall functioning of the 
entire food sector. Welfare and distributional implications of competition at any stage of the food supply chain 
concern several ‘weak subjects’ such as small farmers and consumers who negotiate with “strong subjects” operating 
in more concentrated (industrial and retailing) sectors. In order to balance power across the EU agro-food supply 
chain and achieve a more sustainable distribution of value-added, the main instruments featuring the new paradigm 
of market organisation proposed by the CAP reform are Producer Organisation, Association Producer Organisation  
and Inter-Branch Organisation. We employ a simple bargaining model aimed to identify the determinants of the 
bargaining power in the food supply chain; the model is used to assess the capability of POs to strengthen farmers’ 
bargaining power. The results show that, under certain conditions, the joint selling and production planning can be 
effective tools for rebalancing power in the agro-food system. We also concluded that requiring a minimum size for 
POs may improve their effectiveness. Such requirement should be calibrated on the structure of the downstream 
(upstream) relevant market: more consolidated buyer (seller) industries call for larger POs. 
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1. Introduction 
The food supply chain, which plays a substantial role in the European economy connecting sectors such as agricultural, 
food processing industry and distribution that together make more than 5% of European value-added and 7% of 
employment, is evolving rapidly (EC, 2015). Changes in the organization of international trade, technology, and 
society’s needs are triggering a deep restructuring of the agro-food supply chain which increasingly leads to a complex 
series of inter-related markets (through coordination, integration and contracts). Furthermore, competition is one of 
the major issues in agro-food supply chains. Agricultural markets are highly interdependent and competition at 
different stages of the supply chain matters for the overall functioning of the entire food sector. Welfare and 
distributional implications of competition at any stage of the food supply chain concern several ‘weak subjects’ such 
as small farmers and consumers who negotiate with “strong subjects” operating in more concentrated (industrial and 
retailing) sectors.  
In order to balance power across the EU agro-food supply chain and achieve a more sustainable distribution of value-
added, the main instruments featuring the new paradigm of market organisation proposed by the 2013 CAP reform 
are Producer Organisation (PO), Association Producer Organisation (APO) e Inter-Branch Organisation (IBO).  
The aim of this analysis is to assess to what extent the new measures for the single CMO introduced by the last CAP 
reform may improve functioning of the EU food value chain and strengthen the bargaining power of farmers. 
Specifically, we focus on the POs' capacity in exploiting their functions and rebalancing the bargaining power along the 
supply chain. We employ a simple bargaining model aimed to identify the determinants of the bargaining power in the 
food supply chain; the model is used to assess the capability of POs to strengthen farmers’ bargaining power.  
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2. The Methodology 
Balancing power across the agro-food supply chain is a key concern in modern agricultural policy. The definition of 
power is a key issue in this field. The literature defines several kinds of powers (e.g.: market power and bargaining 
power) and the choice of the most fitting definition is a critical modelling choice and has strong policy and welfare 
implications. While market power is defined as “The ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise and maintain price 
above the level that would prevail under competition” (Perloff et al. 2007), bargaining power is referred as “the power 
to obtain a concession from another party by threatening to impose a cost, or withdraw a benefit, if the party does 
not grant the concession.” (Kirkwood 2005). Unlike market power theory, the emphasis of the definition is on a 
specific negotiation among certain parties, disregarding the outcome at industry level. Since bargaining models are 
more effective in describing the complexity of the food system compared to market power models, we employ a 
simple bargaining model aimed to identify the determinants of the bargaining power in the food supply chain; the 
model is used to assess the capability of POs to strengthen farmers’ bargaining power.  
Consider a buyer and a seller negotiating about a trade opportunity. The buyer acts as middleman between the 
supplier and the consumers. He buys a product X from the supplier and sells it to the consumer. The negotiation is 
successful if buyer and seller agree on the quantity supplied, the wholesale price and all other contract terms (lump-
sum transfers such as trade spending, etc.). If the negotiation is successful a contract is written, trade happens and 
parties share the total gain from trade (TGT) according to the rules agreed upon in the contract. If the negotiation 
fails, trade does not happen and parties gain the profits from the next best available alternatives (the so-called 
disagreement payoffs or outside option profits). 
 
 
Figure 1: Bilateral, zero-sum bargaining. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the key elements of a simple bilateral bargaining
1
. In theory, the TGT can be broken down into 
three areas: i) The supplier’s disagreement payoff (yellow area in Figure 1). This area is equal to the surplus that the 
supplier would receive from the next best alternative if the transaction fails. Clearly, if the middleman offers a share of 
TGT that is smaller than the disagreement payoff, the supplier can credibly threat to withdraw from the trade. ii) The 
middleman’s disagreement payoff (red area in Figure 1) is his/her surplus from the next best outside option. The 
middleman can credibly threat to fail any negotiation resulting in a lower share of TGT than the disagreement payoff; 
iii) The difference between the TGT and the aggregate disagreement payoff (if positive) is the negotiation space 
(orange area in Figure 1). The boundaries between the disagreement payoff areas and the negotiation space are the 
agents’ bargaining positions.  
                                                          
1
 In our example, the middleman and the supplier bargain over the total gain from trade (TGT), using a lump-sum transfer. Assuming a zero-sum 
game greatly simplifies the example. 
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Any point in the negotiation space is a feasible negotiation outcome because no agent can credibly threat the other to 
fail the trade. The specific outcome within the negotiation space depends on the relative magnitude of negotiation 
power defined as the ability to impose a negotiation outcome that is as close as possible to the most desired point in 
the negotiation space. It depends on the ability of imposing negotiation rules, negotiation skills, patience, technical 
constraints, risk attitudes and information. If the middleman has a strong negotiation power compared to the 
supplier, then the outcome transfer is closer to the supplier’s bargaining position than to the middleman’s one. Vice 
versa, if the middleman is relatively weak, the outcome is close to his/her position.  
 
3. Results 
Joint selling is a key activity of POs. Here we illustrate the intuition of the model
2
. Consider a simple model of 
sequential bargaining among multiple agents. Each supplier and each buyer pick a random counterpart and start a 
bilateral negotiation. If the negotiation fails, they move on and negotiate with another partner. This model can be 
used to describe the horizontal integration process. We represent joint selling as a reduction in the number of 
suppliers in the market and we propose a simplified version of the Inderst-Wey model (2007) 
The theoretical model identified the basic economic mechanism allowing POs to rebalance bargaining power along the 
food supply chain. Figure 2 summarizes the key findings. Assume that farmers are bargaining with a buyer over the 
value of a trade. The PO can improve the final outcome in three ways: 
 Effects on negotiation power. The PO can improve farmers’ ability to negotiate with the buyer (see Box 4). A 
PO can hire professional negotiators, has better access to legal services, and more in general has access to 
human, financial and technical resources that are unaffordable for the single farmers. Such access can 
improve the ability to counter buyer power. 
 Effects on buyer’s bargaining position. PO’s horizontal integration can reduce buyer’s trade options, 
worsening its bargaining position. The reduction of the buyer’s disagreement payoff – holding everything else 
constant – increases the negotiation space, giving farmers the opportunity of appropriating of more value. 
 Effects on farmers’ bargaining position. Associated farmers may have access to alternative marketing 
channels that are unavailable to individual firms. This implies that a PO can increase farmers’ disagreement 
payoff. If this is the case, the negotiation space is reduced to the buyer’s detriment and farmers can keep a 
higher share of the TGT. 
 
Figure 2. Rebalancing bargaining power: the role of PO 
 
However, small POs might be unable to improve farmers’ bargaining position and significantly alter the negotiation 
outcome and the effectiveness of a PO in improving farmers’ bargaining position depends on the concentration of the 
downstream market. The more the downstream sector is consolidated, the larger the size of the PO should be. 
                                                          
2 The formal derivation and the assumptions of the model are in Sorrentino et al., 2016. 
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4. Conclusion 
The food supply chain, which plays a substantial role in the European economy, the food supply chain is a complex 
series of inter-related markets (with increasing forms of coordination, integration and contracts). Welfare implications 
of competition at any stage of the food supply chain concern several ‘weak subjects’ such as small farmers and 
consumers, and for that reason are of specific interests for policy-makers. The recent 2013 reform opted for a more 
decentralized approach, and now private entities such as PO, APOs or IBOs are assuming an increasing role in the 
governance of the agricultural markets.  
A simple bargaining model has been employed in order to assess on the POs' capacity in exploiting their functions and 
rebalancing the bargaining power along the supply chain.  
The results show that, under certain conditions, the joint selling and production planning can be effective tools for 
rebalancing power in the agro-food system. We also concluded that requiring a minimum size for POs may improve 
their effectiveness. Such requirement should be calibrated on the structure of the downstream (upstream) relevant 
market: more consolidated buyer (seller) industries call for larger POs. Furthermore, promoting the diversification of 
the POs' market channels is a key success factor. This objective can be pursued even allowing multi-sector POs. 
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